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Abstract
The complexity of science
In this article an alternative philosophy o f science based on ideas drawn from the 
study o f complex adaptive systems is presented. As a result o f the enormous 
expansion in scientific disciplines, and the number o f scientists and scientific 
institutions in the twentieth century, I  believe science can be characterised as a 
complex system. I  want to interpret the processes o f science through which 
scientists themselves determine what is regarded as good science. This characteri­
sation o f science as a complex system can supply an answer to the question why 
the sciences have been so successful in solving growing numbers o f problems and 
correcting their own mistakes.
I utilise components o f complexity theory to explain and interpret science as a 
complex system. 1 first explain the concept o f complexity in ordinary language. The 
explanation o f science as a complex system starts with a definition o f the basic 
rules guiding the behaviour o f science as a complex system. Next, I indicate how 
various sciences have resulted through the implementation o f these rules in the 
study o f a specific aspect o f reality. The explanation o f the growth o f science 
through evolutionary adaptation and learning forms the core o f the article.
I . Introduction
Can the new sciences of complexity modify and deepen our everyday 
understanding of complexity so as to improve our interpretation of science as a 
complex system? Recent developments in these sciences indicate that we might 
be on the threshold of startling new developments that could invigorate several 
sciences in exciting ways. The development of complexity theory with applica­
tions across a wide range of disciplines promises to deal with intricate issues and 
intractable problems (Stein, 1989:xiii), develop theories capable of linking 
sciences across disciplinary boundaries (Stein, 1989:xv), and modify the domi­
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nant reductionist approach to problem-solving in vogue since the advent of 
Newtonian science (cf. Cilliers, 1993:4, 5; Casti, 1994:273; Waldrop, 1992:13).
I want to add to the studies in complexity by interpreting science as a complex 
system in order to provide a better understanding of science as currently 
practised. Murray Gell-Mann (1994:266) claims that “learning and thinking in 
general exemplify complex adaptive systems at work” and adds that human 
creative thinking is perhaps the best expression of those skills. If Gell-Mann’s 
remark is true, one could suspect that science as prime example of human 
thinking, learning, and creativity should be the most complex system on earth. 
Whether or not that is true, at least an attempt at explaining science as complex 
system seems justified.
Can we describe science as complex? We often use the word complex in 
everyday language. Something is described as complex in everyday language 
when it consists o f a number o f  parts that vary in kind and importance. 
Language is a common example of something described as complex. It consists 
of many kinds of words and sentences, that combine in endless ways according 
to many rules.
In complex phenomena the relationships between parts differ and are intricate. 
Human beings are often described as complex, in part because of the intricate 
and complicated relationships between differing parts, such as brain, blood, 
muscles, organs, nerves, hormones, emotions, and neurones.
Nevertheless, in complex phenomena these parts combine into a complicated 
whole with characteristics of its own. A skyscraper requires the complex 
construction of many different materials in varying relationships, but never­
theless the skyscraper forms a complicated whole with describable characteris­
tics. The combination of parts into a whole can be described in various ways. 
The parts can be interwoven, connected together, involved in various degrees, 
intimately mixed, intricately intertwined, entangled, or united. The way different 
parts are combined in human beings differ from the combinations of parts found 
in skyscrapers or language.
When phenomena, events, or behaviour are called complex in everyday 
language, this indicates that people judge such events, phenomena, or behaviour 
not to be easily analysed or understood. Rather, it is difficult to determine the 
factors involved and to disentangle them. Not even the best minds in medical 
science can easily analyse the functions of the parts o f the human brain as a 
complex phenomenon, nor explain their complicated interactions.
Thus, in ordinary language a complex system would be something that defies 
easy analysis or explanation, consists o f many parts that vary in kind and 
importance, has different relationships between its parts, yet combines the parts
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into a whole that exhibits unique characteristics. According to this definition of 
the words “complex” and “complexity” in ordinary language, science qualifies 
as a complex system, as easy explanations of what it is and how it works are not 
available. The number of parts of science, whether it be specialised fields of 
study, established theories, or kinds of scientists are overwhelming. The nature 
o f relationships between sciences or among scientists are endless in variety and 
constantly changing.
In this article I want to present a philosophy of science based on ideas drawn 
from the study of complex adaptive systems. As a result of the enormous 
expansion in scientific disciplines, the number of scientists and scientific 
institutions in the twentieth century, I believe science can be characterised as a 
complex system. I want to interpret the processes of science through which 
scientists themselves determine what is regarded as good science. This 
characterisation of science as complex system can give an answer to the 
question why the different sciences are so successful in solving growing 
numbers of problems and correcting their own mistakes.
2. Science as a complex system
2.1 Introduction
In this section, I want to utilise components of complexity theory to explain 
science. I will first explain the kind of complexity that seems feasible in an 
interpretation of science. The explanation of science as a complex system starts 
with a definition of the basic rules that guide the behaviour of science as a 
complex system. Next, I will show how various sciences result through the 
implementation of these rules in the study of a specific aspect of reality. The 
explanation of the growth of science through evolutionary adaptation and 
learning will follow next.
2.2 Explaining complexity
In the sciences of complexity the concept of complexity gains new meaning as it 
refers to systems that have the ability to change, evolve, adapt, learn, and 
reorganise their own structures. Complexity emerges from the collective 
behaviour of the components of such systems. Many interactions take place 
between components that can be diverse in form and capability (Holland, 
1995:6).
What kind of explanation of the complexity of science is possible? A 
quantitative explanation of complexity tries to compress the complexity of a 
system into a measurable or calculable form. This kind of explanation is not 
possible, as mathematical and computer analyses are not possible for human 
systems of such high complexity as science (Kline, 1995:96). The farther
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complex systems are from the possibility of directly observing them at work, the 
more difficult scientific investigation of such systems become (Kline, 1995: 
153). Human observers can only observe limited examples of scientists at work; 
never a representative sample of the overwhelming magnitude of sciences or 
scientists at work in the world. More access to the work of scientists become 
possible through reading research reports embodied in articles and books. 
Whether detailed views enabling quantification of the ever changing scientific 
disciplines and maps of their continually shifting interconnections and networks 
are possible seems highly improbable.
A qualitative interpretation of science, in the sense of a synoptic overview 
providing a broad outline of science as complex system will have to suffice. 
Capturing the complexity of science will entail descriptions or explanations of 
important processes shaping science. This involves compressing the com­
plexities of science into understandable overviews, based on observations of 
scientists at work, analyses of research reports, and the interpretations 
philosophers and historians of science provide.
2.3 Basic rules lead to complex behaviour
Characteristic o f complex systems is that extraordinarily intricate behaviour 
results from many simultaneous interactions between the components of systems 
that are governed by a few simple rules (cf. Martin Rees quoted in Brockman, 
1995:318; Coveney & Highfield, 1995:302). Complexities are generated and 
sculpted by simple rules that enable a myriad possible ways for the components 
o f the system to interact (Waldrop, 1992:86). These rules combine with orderly 
initial conditions and the operation of chance in a specific space and time 
resulting in complex structures and behaviour emerging (Gell-Mann, 1994:329). 
If this is true of science as a complex system, what are the basic rules underlying 
the complexities of the diverse scientific practices?
I want to provide a first level of analysis of what science is by suggesting a 
minimal conception of science. This conception is based on the following four 
rules that are common to both human and natural sciences and are responsible 
for generating the complexities of modem science. These rules guide the human 
quest for intelligibility and optimal understanding of the worlds around and 
within us (Van Huyssteen, 1997:13). These rules are the following:
1. Use specialised problem-solving. Humans are continually involved in 
problem-solving and science is a specialised way of solving problems. In 
science problems are solved through research. In scientific research a variety 
of specialised “instruments” are used to deal with research problems, such as 
theories, hypotheses, technical equipment (microscopes, measuring instru­
ments, and so on), and methods (interviews, experiments, observation, etc.)
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2. Justify your findings. No findings in science will be accepted if scientists do 
not provide reasons or evidence in support of them. Findings are as strong as 
the justifications that fellow scientists can accept.
3. Refer to previous work. In every scientific discipline scientists are part of a 
history of intellectual developments that have preceded them. To produce 
acceptable scientific results, scientists must demonstrate that they have noted 
and are building on the important contributions of their predecessors.
4. Convince your scientific community. No intellectual work can count as a new 
scientific contribution if it is not accepted by fellow scientists. To produce 
new scientific results scientists must convince their colleagues that their work 
was done according to appropriate methods, that all relevant previous work 
was taken into account, and that their findings fit in with currently firmly 
established knowledge (cf. Rossouw, 1993:95-97).
These four basic rules are applied by scientists to different fields of study, where 
different aspects of reality and various kinds of problems are studied. In the 
process of their application, the basic rules are specified and elaborated. Their 
specification and elaboration depend on the nature of the objects being studied 
and the results of the meshing of the rules with the subject matter under 
investigation. Two examples will illustrate the point.
Human sciences studying literature must devise methods to establish the central 
themes and meanings of the texts they study. Within these sciences they have 
several methods that are appropriate for interpreting the meaning of texts. These 
methods are adapted and complemented depending on the language of the 
literature, the historical period in which the literary texts originated, and the 
broad cultural background influencing them. Researchers studying such texts 
now, must note what their colleagues have already attempted and what has 
worked and what not. The study of the ancient sacred texts of the Bible might 
require modified methods from those used to study contemporary English 
literature, for example. To suggest modified methods requires that a scientist 
must submit justified proposals to the community of scientists for their 
judgement whether the proposed method is appropriate and feasible. Specialised 
problem-solving methods in the literary human sciences are developed to be 
appropriate to the nature of the objects of study, that is, literature written in a 
specific language and at a particular time and place in history.
In the case of biology specialised methods of problem-solving are needed that 
differ substantially from those in the literary human sciences. A biologist 
studying the migration routes of elephants wants to keep track of their 
movements. This problem can be solved with the help of satellite navigation 
systems. If biologists want to study the physiology of elephants, they must know 
what others have already done, so as not to duplicate their work, to be
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knowledgeable about available information, and to know which are unresolved 
problems or underresearched areas. Existing knowledge can provide a guide to 
biologists to get them to the frontiers of knowledge and ignorance. In studying 
the cardio-vascular system of elephants, biologists might learn useful obser­
vational techniques from specialists in human medicine who might have 
developed sophisticated equipment for observing and studying the human 
cardio-vascular system. They will have to convince their fellow scientists that 
these instruments and techniques developed for humans are appropriate for use 
in the case of elephants, or if  they need modifications, the need for such 
modifications must be argued for with good reasons.
These examples show that the nature of the objects studied, assumed by 
scientists to be intelligible and open to rational exploration (Van Huyssteen, 
1997:219), have a major influence on the development o f any science and the 
way the minimal rules are applied and interpreted.
Three further examples drawn from widely differing sciences show in greater 
detail how the object o f study and the nature o f the problem under investigation 
usually dictate the specialised problem-solving methods and techniques for 
observation and gathering of data. The examples illustrate the ways in which 
scientists design appropriate tools for investigating particular subject matter and 
how they gain evidence to justify their findings. The examples are the recent 
exploration o f Mars, the description o f the cultural code guiding the meaning of 
human touch behaviour, and the interpretation of the meaning of an ancient 
sacred text.
• The exploration of Mars
The recent exploration of Mars is interplanetary science done by a global team 
of scientists. The exploration is an example of large-scale scientific research 
funded by government, done by a large interdisciplinary research team led by 
the Jet Propulsion Centre at NASA, in collaboration with associates from 
scientific institutions across the globe. Representatives of several sciences had to 
co-operate to enable Pathfinder and its rover, called Sojourner, to do its 
observations on Mars. To get the Pathfinder spacecraft to Mars required 
knowledge provided by physics and cosmology to enable the craft to land within 
a 60 km diameter after a journey of 190 million kilometres. Further scientific 
knowledge from mathematics and physics was needed to enable the spacecraft to 
decelerate from the 26 200 km/h it was travelling when entering the atmosphere 
o f Mars to the 37 .6 km/h it travelled when hitting the Ares Vallis (Mars Valley). 
The protection against extreme heat when entering the atmosphere of Mars, as 
well as the parachute, rockets, and air bags enabling a soft landing are further 
proofs of the use of sophisticated scientific knowledge and technology required 
for the mission.
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Pathfinder and Sojourner made meteorological, geological, and visual observa­
tions on Mars. Meteorological observations were made by instruments 
measuring windspeed, temperature, and the quality of air. Geological observa­
tions were made by an Alpha Proton x-ray spectrometer that can detect the 
presence of minerals through reading the characteristic emissions projected by 
specific elements contained in Martian rocks. Magnets mounted on Sojourner 
attracted magnetic dust which could be analysed by the spectrometer. Visual 
observations were made of rocks, patterns on the soil, geological formations, 
and interactions between the Martian surface and its atmosphere. Sets of stereo­
scopic cameras enabled scientists to estimate the depth, height, and distance of 
the pictures taken of Mars. All these observations had to be digitally encoded 
and sent to earth via radio signals. Large dish antennas collected these signals 
and sent them to JPL in Pasadena, California, via satellite or cable. These coded 
signals were decoded by computer, projected by means of video technology, and 
made available on the Internet.
The technology required for making these observations on Mars and the 
scientific knowledge behind the whole project are staggering. Several sub­
disciplines of physics are involved, as well as sophisticated mathematical tech­
niques for complicated calculations. Geology and meteorology are deeply 
involved, as are computer science and different engineering sciences. The scale 
of the project is so large that dozens of scientists were involved besides the 
multidisciplinary team at JPL in Pasadena.
• Touch behaviour
The second example deals with human scientists interested in understanding the 
cultural meanings that human beings communicate through their touch 
behaviour. These scientists have similarly combined methods and results from 
many scientific disciplines. To observe the meanings human beings attach to 
physically touching other human beings provides a major headache for a 
scientist studying human communication. Could one observe a sufficient 
number of people in all possible situations where they touch one another, even if 
you exclude all sexual behaviour? Suppose you could, would it be possible to 
deduce the meanings thereof without interviewing both the person who touched 
and was touched? Jones and Yarbrough (1985) solved this problem by adapting 
an existing research method in the human sciences, called the method of 
contextual analysis. Using this method, researchers would make permanent 
records of the behaviour they want to study through film, video, or auditory 
recordings. Relevant features of the behaviour are coded and features of the 
environment and social occasion recorded. These records are used to analyse the 
behaviour and whether it only occurs when a certain combination of elements is 
present or not. Jones and Yarbrough modified this method by combining it with 
participatory observation, a research method developed in anthropology. They 
trained individuals to make detailed reports about the parts of their body that
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others touched, any comments accompanying the touches, the intended 
meanings thereof, the time and place it happened, and so on. They provided the 
participant observers with a “Touch Observation Form” on which they could 
record all the details o f touches.
Jones and Yarbrough creatively synthesised two research methods drawn from 
disciplines other than their own. There are still more traces of other sciences in 
their development of a theoretical framework within which they understand 
touch behaviour, conduct their research, and interpret their findings. They con­
structed their theoretical framework from theories and research findings in 
nursing science, psychotherapy, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communi­
cation science, occupational therapy, and anthropology. In their analysis of 
observational data they use several sophisticated statistical techniques.
• The study of ancient sacred texts
The third example deals with an academic discipline with controversial 
scientific status. Many people doubt the scientific status o f disciplines studying 
ancient sacred texts such as the Bible. However, scientists in these disciplines 
are similarly creative in devising methods and techniques and similarly adept at 
utilising the results o f other scientific disciplines for understanding the meaning 
of even the most obscure ancient sacred text. To decipher the meaning of the 
notoriously difficult apocalyptic text of Revelation in the New Testament, Jan A. 
du Rand (1993a, 1993b, 1996a, 1996b) approaches his research problem in ways 
similar to those of the scientists discussed above. He assumes that Revelation is 
intelligible, open to rational exploration, and has meaning as a whole.
Du Rand’s focus is on understanding the meaning of the text of Revelation. As 
methods he employs textual analysis, literary analysis (aided by insights from 
musicology), historical analysis, narrative analysis, theological analysis, and the 
methods of Greek grammar and syntax. With these methods he searches for 
patterns and structures in the text o f Revelation. He interprets the text as a 
meaningfully artistic whole through identifying a Leitmotiv, defined as a theme 
that is “modified on subsequent appearances to represent or symbolise an idea in 
a dramatic work” (Du Rand, 1993a:304). The idea of a Leitmotiv is comple­
mented by the musicological term, basso ostinato, that he defines as a “short 
phrase or melody that is repeated over and over in the bass parts” with the 
function of binding the composition together (Du Rand, 1993a:301).
Du Rand explores the role of concepts like “Zion” and “Spirit” by tracing their 
meanings in related texts within Jewish religious traditions and through deter­
mining their links and contrasts with other parts of Revelation, as well as their 
function and meaning within the broader theological narrative of Revelation 
itself. As a result he presents a multitude of textual references to his scientific
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community as evidence for his interpretation of the concepts “Zion” and 
“Spirit”.
Almost inseparable from these textual analyses are his attempts to place the text 
within various contexts, leading him to discover intertextual links with texts 
from the Old Testament, ancient Jewish and Greek literature, and other New 
Testament texts. He further contextualises Revelation within the history and 
religious traditions of Israel, the ancient Near East, and early Christianity. His 
interpretation of the meaning of Revelation rests on the way he activates a 
multitude of textual evidence to become an intertextual event.
These examples show the development of specialised problem-solving methods 
and techniques drawn from a variety of sciences that produce evidence 
acceptable to fellow scientists. The examples also demonstrate the extraordinary 
ability of scientists to devise new sensors for detecting and observing 
phenomena and events in the world in order to gather information for adequately 
modelling the world.
2.4 Complex systems gather information about their world
One of the major capabilities of complex systems is their ability to gather 
information about the environment and store it for future use (Cilliers, 1993:18). 
The process of gathering new information is crucial for most sciences. Through 
new techniques of observation, new findings, and new explanatory theories 
scientists collect, analyse, and interpret data about the worlds around us and 
within ourselves. The sciences deal in diverse ways with different kinds of 
subject matter in the process of the gathering of data. Scientists devise creative 
methods and ingenious techniques for increasing precision in gathering 
information about the world. Increased precision results from specialised 
problem-solving applied to the demands of the specific objects of study. New 
scientific developments can increase the precision of information, as the 
following discussion will illustrate.
Aristotle, one of the greatest scientists ever (cf. Dunbar, 1995:37-40), argued in 
his Nichomachean Ethics that his discussion of ethics will be adequate if it has 
as much “clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be 
sought for alike in all discussions” (Aristotle, 1925:2, 3). His argument is that 
the ethical actions he is investigating exhibit much variety and fluctuation and 
therefore he must be content to speak of his subject with premises that indicate 
the truth “roughly and in outline”. An educated person would expect no more, as 
such a person knows to look for precision in each class of things “just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits”. Conversely, Aristotle says, an educated person 
would not foolishly accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, nor 
demand demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician (Aristotle, 1925:3).
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Aristotle’s argument that the degree of precision possible in a science depends 
on the nature of the subject matter studied is still valid today. His point can be 
illustrated by remarks made by an economist, Brian Arthur, trying to explain the 
economy as a complex adaptive system (cf. Waldrop, 1992:141, 151, 255). 
Arthur argues that the economy is like the biosphere that is always evolving, 
changing, and exploring new territory (Waldrop, 1992:255). The difficulty of the 
science of economics is that the objects of study are imperfectly smart agents 
who are exploring their way “into an essentially infinite space of possibilities” 
(Waldrop, 1992:151). Arthur’s comparison of the complexities that economics 
have to deal with in comparison to those of physics are worth quoting in full:
W e call our particles ‘agen ts’ -  banks, firms, consum ers, governm ents ... O ur 
particles in econom ics are sm art, w hereas yours in physics are dum b. In 
physics an elem entary particle has no past, no experience, no goals, no hopes 
or fears about the future. It ju s t is. T hat’s w hy physicists can talk so freely 
about ‘universal law s’: their particles respond to forces blindly, w ith absolute 
obedience. B ut in econom ics, ... our particles have to think ahead, and try to 
figure out how  o ther particles m ight react i f  they w ere to undertake certain 
actions. O ur particles have to react on the basis o f  expectations and strategies 
... th a t’s w hat m akes econom ics truly difficult (W aldrop, 1992:141).
From Arthur’s description of the objects o f study in economics, it is clear that 
similar precision as in physics would be virtually impossible, thus excluding 
also similarly strong causal explanations and accurate predictions of the 
behaviour studied. This does not imply that scientific advances -  new techniques 
for observation, new findings, new explanatory theories -  cannot transform the 
degree of precision possible in a field of study. An example of the study of 
human thought processes will illustrate the point.
The study of human thought processes was long ignored in the sciences. These 
processes were studied for many centuries through introspective methods in 
philosophy, through analyses of the products of human thinking embodied in 
texts in literature or logic, through observation of the effects of coincidental 
cases of brain injury in medical science, or through information gained through 
dialogue in psychology. However, recent developments in scientific technolo­
gies have enabled scientists to observe brain functions through various 
techniques scanning the brain and to model brain processes through the use of 
computers and artificial neural nets. These techniques have enabled medical 
scientists to reach new levels o f precision in determining human thought 
processes underlying various kinds of human activities, such as learning, 
memory, and speech (Coveny & Highfield, 1995:11).
2.5 Complex systems model their worlds
Complex adaptive systems build models containing assumptions about the world 
out there that aid them in understanding and anticipating events that influence
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their behaviour (Waldrop, 1992:146, 177). They have to be able to understand 
and use the information they get from the world through their sensors. Science 
as complex system continually and actively search for and gather new 
experience that are packaged as information. Experience must be able to enter 
the system through sensors. Sensors can be the human senses or methods, 
techniques, and instruments extending the senses. Characteristic of science is the 
multiplicity of sensors strengthening, amplifying, and complementing human 
senses.
Complex adaptive systems must identify those regularities and patterns in 
information coming from their environments that are relevant to their purposes 
(cf. Holland, 1995:31-32). These regularities are condensed into models that 
enable action and behaviour in the world (cf. Gell-Mann, 1994:17), Models of 
relevant aspects of their environment must be modifiable so that they can be 
improved upon receiving new information. Models are continually tried out to 
determine whether the complex adaptive system can act successfully on their 
prescriptions and predictions (cf. Holland, 1995:33-34). The results of the action 
and behaviour must be monitored and fed back to modify the models, if 
necessary. In the light of experience, the models must be modified (Waldrop, 
1992:179).
The results of modelling in the sciences through the observation and inter­
pretation of problems under investigation can be extremely diverse in content 
and style (cf. Ziman, 1994:179). Despite this diversity contributions to scientific 
knowledge usually have a publicly shared, quasi-objective, and schematic form 
similar to those of maps (Ziman, 1995:72). These maps are attempts at model­
ling the world that are revised or rejected through critical examination and 
testing. Amongst the diversity of maps provided by scientists are experimental 
measurements, logical analyses, observational data, theoretical calculations, 
mathematical models, new theories or hypotheses, instrumental techniques, 
textual analyses, critical surveys, and pictorial communications of pattern 
recognitions, such as diagrams, photographs, maps, and graphs (Ziman, 
1995:71; 1994:179).
Gathering new experience, recognising patterns, modelling regularities, and 
modifying models after critical testing lies at the heart of the sciences.
2.6 Complex systems recombine, rearrange, and revise 
themselves
Complex systems continually recombine and rearrange their building blocks and 
revise their structure and organisation (cf. Waldrop, 1992:145, 146). Complex 
systems do this as a result of gaining new experience. Rearrangement of 
components, revision of structure, and recombination of building blocks are the 
fundamental mechanisms of adaptation, evolution, and learning, which become
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necessary as a result of experience (Waldrop, 1992:146). In the sciences 
rearrangement, recombination, and revision are common occurrences, despite 
the attitude of many scientists humorously expressed in the “First Command­
ment of Academia: Thou shalt not transgress thy disciplinary boundary” (Kline, 
1995:5).
This section does not focus on changes in science that result from developments 
within the boundaries of a specific science, but rather on the way that develop­
ments outside the boundaries o f a scientific discipline can be used to modify 
scientific practice within those boundaries. Thus, the focus is not on the effect of 
new results and theories developed by a researcher of a particular science, but 
rather on the common phenomenon of rearrangements and recombinations that 
follow from appropriating new methods, techniques, theories, and results 
developed elsewhere, by other sciences. The ongoing integration and grafting of 
elements from other disciplines into one’s own are driven by the hope of 
discovering things in other disciplines that can extend the limits of one’s own 
discipline (Van Huyssteen, 1997:17, 32).
For many decades sciences have been influenced by intellectual developments 
occurring in other sciences. Obvious examples are the role of mathematical and 
statistical techniques used for analysis in an ever-growing variety of sciences. 
But are such influences restricted to borrowing and using these instruments and 
tools? Are other influences from one scientific discipline to another, such as the 
transfer of methods, theories, and results, excluded? Definitely not. The three 
examples of diverse scientific investigations in a previous section demonstrate 
how various sciences continually rearrange and recombine themselves through 
selective borrowing and integration of aspects of other disciplines. These 
recombinations and rearrangements point to the interdisciplinary nature of most 
sciences.
I want to argue that scientific investigation in one scientific discipline leads 
scientists to discover overlaps between their field of study and other fields of 
study. Selective borrowing occurs -  without regard for academic frontiers (cf. 
Ziman, 1995:95) -  o f methods of investigation, techniques for observation and 
analysis, tools for computing, results for background knowledge, and theories 
for explanation and prediction. The result is that several sciences share various 
aspects of their methods, techniques, and results with one another. For this 
reason many sciences have lots in common. For example, mathematics, statis­
tics, and computer technology function as instruments for analysis in many 
sciences. Which aspects, the extent, and depth to which scientists use the tools 
provided by mathematics, statistics, and computer science vary considerably in 
widely differing sciences like botany, psychology, and economics. Similarly, 
theories and results are often shared in many sciences. For example, nuclear 
physics play an important role in different scientific disciplines, just as theories 
of interpretation are shared by a variety of human sciences.
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Some sciences are reconstructed through new discoveries, theoretical insights, or 
new linkages between previously distant disciplines (Ziman, 1994:20, 22). 
Though scientific disciplines evolve to become more specialised and frequently 
differentiate and split apart as result, they just as often recombine to form 
intricate and overlapping connections with one another. Connections are made at 
theoretical and instrumental levels, boundaries between theories and disciplines 
are revised, and intellectual mergers between theories and disciplines take place 
(Ziman, 1995:84). Ziman describes the complexities of these processes as 
beyond ordinary human understanding (Ziman, 1994:71). Linking previously 
unrelated information is a typical creative scientific contribution. These re­
combinations of sciences as a redrawing of the cognitive maps of disciplines is a 
central theme in the developmental history of the sciences (Ziman, 1994:63).
The sharing and borrowing of methods, techniques, results, and theories suggest 
that there are more similarities between individual scientific disciplines than 
thus far suggested. An intermediate conception of science can account for these 
overlaps and similarities. Such a conception aims to give a description of the 
nature of science at the level of clusters of individual sciences that are 
temporarily grouped together through shared interests. The meshing of a few 
simple rules with the specific subject matter investigated by a scientific 
discipline does not create sciences that necessarily develop in totally different 
directions. Shared interests between scientific disciplines abound, as several 
sciences are closely related. Close relations result from studying similar objects 
or phenomena or using similar methods, techniques, results, and theories. The 
similarities and overlaps between sciences are not permanent or fixed, as new 
relationships and overlaps are constantly forged based on new developments in 
diverse sciences. Nevertheless, individual sciences cluster together on the basis 
of shared interests in subject matter, methods, techniques, theories, and results.
Different clusters of sciences might have little more in common with one 
another than the few basic rules specified above. Sometimes the detailed 
interpretation of what the few basic rules require with respect to the subject 
matter under investigation can lead to further distance between sciences, 
creating a feeling of fragmented discourses that are virtually incomprehensible 
for people not conversant with its esoteric language (cf. Lyotard, 1979). This 
often observed inability of communication between scientists from different 
fields of study can be explained through a maximal conception of science. This 
conception deals with science on a third level beyond the minimal conception 
based on basic shared rules and the intermediate conception dealing with 
overlapping sciences grouped into clusters. This third level of analysis requires 
an explanation of the ability of complex adaptive systems to self-organise.
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2.7 Science as a complex system self-organises
As the number of scientists involved in a particular field of study grows, the 
scientific discipline starts to become complex. This happens through the ability 
o f complex adaptive systems to self-organise.
Complex adaptive systems have the ability to change and develop their 
structures with the aim to better adapt to, cope with, or manipulate their 
environment. They thus continually transform their structures and organisation 
as a result of rich interactions between components of the system, as well as 
between the system and its environment. Interaction with the environment is 
complex, as many parts of the environment are also evolving. One could thus 
refer to co-evolution, as individuals try to adapt to their evolving environment 
(cf. Holland, 1995:10; Waldrop, 1992:259).
Self-organisation does not result from a central controller, as complex systems 
usually have no central controller with complete control over them. The 
dynamics of these systems allow a great deal of autonomy, although there might 
be some tendencies toward central control. The absence of rigid central control 
results in systems with robust, adaptive, flexible, and innovative organisation 
(Brockman, 1995:349; Casti, 1994:272).
Self-organisation clearly plays a major role in science. Science is institutionally 
embodied in universities, research institutes, and industries. At universities the 
sciences often organise themselves into faculties such as Medicine, Economics, 
Law, and so on, which cluster together related sciences organised into depart­
ments. Some sciences, like particle physics, have become collectivised because 
research facilities have become extremely sophisticated and expensive. For these 
reasons they have to be funded by governments and shared by scientists from 
many different countries, like CERN in Europe (cf. Ziman, 1994 and 1995:364) 
Not only are these facilities shared, but some experiments involve teams of a 
hundred scientists and more. Many scientific projects require the input of 
scientists with various specialised skills drawn from different sciences (Ziman, 
1994:60). Similar patterns of collectivisation in other sciences are marked by a 
large increase in the number of multiply co-authored articles in the last few 
decades (Ziman, 1995:289).
Through regional and national organisations scientists group together for 
promoting their disciplinary interests, especially through conferences and the 
publication o f journals Within organisations specialised interest groups arise 
who share information and exchange ideas. Even smaller formal or informal 
research groups are formed that collaborate on projects on various levels. 
Through publications, i.e., journals and books, important forms of self-organi­
sation take place through the selection of editors, editorial boards, and referees.
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Funding agencies also appoint referees for advice on suitable candidates or 
proposals for research funding.
Self-organisation in science results from the absence of central control. Control 
over what is accepted as science, is widely dispersed throughout the scientific 
community (cf. Waldrop, 1992:145). Referees, editorial boards, and editors of 
thousands of journals and publishers share decisions about what is good science 
and ought to be published. Committees of countless scientific institutions, 
composed of experts, determine appointments, promotions, funding, and prizes. 
Individual scientists involved in research make decisions, gather information, 
and develop arguments for judging existing research and presenting new 
findings. Individual scientists often have informal networks of contacts with 
fellow scientists that are kept up through mail, telephone, guest lectures, and 
conferences.
The richness of the multiple interactions between scientists demonstrates why 
self-organisation is possible within the sciences through widely dispersed 
decision-making powers. As a result the nature, contents, and processes of 
science are continually adapted to fit better with the environment -  whether 
environment here means the objects of study, fellow scientists, or the current 
state of the art research findings, methods, and techniques setting the agenda for 
future research.
The result of the comprehensive ability of the sciences to self-organise through 
widely dispersed control over what qualifies as good science underlies the third 
conception of science. The maximalist conception of science analyses science at 
a third level, viz. that of the community of scientists in a particular field of 
study. This community of scientists determines the nature, standards, accepted 
findings, and workable theories of their discipline on a continual basis. As 
community they decide what kind of research is do-able, what the current state 
of the art is, and what is well-established in the discipline (Ziman, 1995:273).
The critical scrutiny of experts in a discipline temporarily resolves disagree­
ments -  a characteristic feature of science -  only to be disrupted again (Van 
Huyssteen, 1997:250). This never-ending redefinition of what science is by 
leaders in their fields of study is all we have. These judgements come from 
within a discipline where scientists know well enough how to distinguish ways 
of proceeding, whether they are justified or not, fruitful or fruitless, reasoned or 
not. Putnam’s advice is that scientists should not abandon these knowledgeable 
judgements that they as doers, practitioners, and agents of a specific scientific 
discipline make (Putnam, 1990) in favour of judgements from outside their 
discipline imposing standards of science on them.
Competent judgements within a scientific discipline are possible because 
scientists can learn from history and experience. Through comparison of new
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theories, methods, and findings with what has gone before they can judge the 
significance of new proposals and decide whether they are better estimates of 
how the world really is (Van Huyssteen, 1997:253). The acceptance of new 
contributions results in the reinterpretation of existing information to determine 
its correspondence and coherence with what has been judged to be the new 
standard-bearers of significance. As a result selective forgetting takes place, as 
lost significance implies the death of scientific work, and death means being 
forgotten.
Different maximalist versions of individual sciences are in interaction with one 
another and are commonly aggregated under the collective name of science. 
Clustering together implies the typical behaviour of complex adaptive systems. 
When similar complex systems are in interaction, they have a tendency to 
generate other more sophisticated complex systems on a higher level of 
organisation. Such a complex system of complex systems evolves through the 
efforts of the complex agents to survive or improve their positions. Such a 
collective of complex systems are beneficial to the individual complex systems.
Unitary conceptions of science claim to give a reconstructed model of how 
science, in the sense of a complex system of complex systems, works and ought 
to work. Thus, what they are doing is to interpret one specific science, usually 
physics, and generalise those findings to science as the aggregation of complex 
systems. This generalisation is without grounds. Science as complex system of 
complex systems is not a single unified and monolithic enterprise, but resembles 
a “rather ramshackle structure with little coherence among its various parts” 
(Kuhn, 1970:49). The various sciences cohere on a minimal conception of 
science, based on a few basic rules, and some sciences cluster together on the 
basis of shared interests. However, a model developed by philosophers of 
science -  based on the example of one science only -  that ought to be normative 
for all other sciences seems out of the question.
2.8 Science at the edge between order and chaos
The processes through which scientists judge the results of new and existing 
scientific research can be elucidated by another aspect of complex adaptive 
systems, viz., the fact that they are poised between the edge of chaos and order. 
The interplays between order and disorder, stability and fluidity, chaos and 
regularity, and predictability and unpredictability that complex adaptive systems 
exhibit are regarded as one of their most striking features (cf. Stein, 1989:xiv).
Commonly called the edge of chaos, this expression refers to that part of a 
complex adaptive system where its components never quite lock into place, yet 
never quite dissolve into turbulence either. The edge of chaos is described in 
different ways. Some regard it as the constantly shifting battle zone between 
stagnation and anarchy (Waldrop, 1992:12), while others interpret it as the
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tension between regulation through feedbacks and creative response to new 
conditions. The edge of chaos is described as the zone where complex systems 
can be spontaneous and adaptive, or where new ideas can nibble away at the 
status quo (cf. Waldrop, 1992:12).
The edge between order and chaos in science lies at the frontiers of new research 
where research traditions manifest their dynamism in a never-ending dialectic of 
continuity and change (Van Huyssteen, 1997:33). In most scientific disciplines 
opinions simultaneously converge and differ on what are established theories, 
results, methods, and techniques (cf. Rouse, 1990). Scientists have sufficiently 
overlapping convictions about which important developments have shaped their 
discipline thus far to enable communication about the significance of new 
contributions. The shared overlapping convictions enable scientists to discuss 
differences and to make creative contributions. Yet the overlapping convictions 
are in continual tension with new contributions that threaten the coherence of the 
shared convictions of scientists about what scientific results, methods, theories, 
and techniques are significant and dominate their field.
The edge between order and chaos in science has the stability of some shared 
convictions about significant work to enable scientists to judge the value of new 
contributions that threaten to undermine the temporarily established shared 
convictions of significance. But significance in science means exactly that -  to 
change, modify, or add to the preceding history of significant contributions. 
Rouse (1990) thinks that scientists live within various ongoing stories, all 
aiming to push the storyline in diverging directions. The coherence of the 
narrative documenting significant contributions to the development of the 
discipline is under continuous pressure to unravel due to new contributions 
challenging the current state of the art. However, a reasonably coherent narrative 
is needed that encourages and yet controls controversy (cf. Ziman, 1995:82). By 
keeping criticism and imagination in continuous tension, differences within a 
discipline can be kept intelligible and a space exists within which creative work 
can be done (Rouse, 1990).
Through significant contributions modifying the existing cognitive landscape of 
a discipline (cf. Ziman, 1995:275), scientists redefine what the field is about and 
provide new opportunities for research. Solutions to important problems in a 
scientific discipline necessitate that every scientist must reconsider the contents, 
methods, and aims of their research programs (Ziman, 1995:279). Scientists read 
new contributions -  published in books or journals -  with the aim of discovering 
new advances at the frontiers of their discipline. Such advances include results 
they must take account of, research opportunities that they could usefully follow 
up, or methods and techniques that they might employ (Rouse, 1990).
The contents of a scientific discipline currently accepted as significant and thus 
dominating research activities in the discipline are constantly exposed to
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problems, pressures, and challenges (cf. Popper, 1981). Theories are examined 
for their internal coherence, their coherence with established theories and 
results, and for their fit with available evidence. New findings are under pressure 
to withstand critical examination of the methods used for data-gathering and 
whether these methods were consistently and impartially applied. Further 
pressure comes from investigations determining whether the techniques of 
analysis were appropriately applied and skilfully handled.
One result of stringent critical examination and rigorous testing of existing 
scientific contributions is the presentation of imaginative, new scientific 
theories, results, methods, and techniques. These new proposals aim to correct 
problems, deal with challenges, and alleviate pressures on existing accepted 
scientific results. In the process, new contributions proliferate and tend to create 
a chaotic field of new ideas to be sorted out. Again this leads to creative tension 
between already accepted scientific results and the newly proposed contributions 
whose significance are constantly being determined through academic debates, 
critical scrutiny, and rigorous testing. When significant contributions become 
accepted part of the body of established knowledge, no state of equilibrium 
follows. The result rather changes the environment in which scientific research 
is conducted. The changed environment results in new pressures, problems, and 
challenges that must be dealt with through similar processes as described above.
The nature of the edge of chaos in science as complex system draws attention to 
another characteristic o f complex systems, viz. components of complex systems 
co-evolve with their environments. In this case, the components of science can 
refer to the theories, results, methods, techniques, and the conceptions scientists 
have of their disciplines, albeit often tacitly. Complex systems are characterised 
by multiple independent agents that interact with one another in many ways. 
Each agent are constantly reacting and adapting to what the other agents are 
doing (cf. Waldrop, 1992:145). For this reason the environment of an agent is 
not fixed, but constantly evolving. Individual agents must change and improve 
themselves relative to the evolving changes implemented by other agents.
Successful changes thus depend upon what other agents are around, the success 
of those agents’ adaptation, learning, and evolution, the niche an agent fills, the 
agent’s ability to adapt and learn, and sometimes even the past history of an 
agent. Fitness, in the sense of either successful adaptation to the environment, or 
appropriate learning from experience, arises “from the dance of co-evolution” 
(Waldrop, 1992:259). Science is such a system of co-evolving components. 
Ziman (1994:78) calls the scientific enterprise a system with closely linked 
components that are continually evolving. The components -  scientists, theories, 
methods, results, or even disciplines -  grow and change in relation to one 
another.
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The “complexity scientists” use the concept of the edge of chaos in conjunction 
with the idea of self-organised criticality that states complex systems can tune 
themselves toward optimum sensitivity to external inputs. In such a state of 
sensitivity even minor events can start a chain reaction that affects large 
numbers of elements in the system (cf. Waldrop, 1992:304-305). Such a chain 
reaction can lead to breakdowns of all sizes ripping through the system and 
rearranging it. Complex systems in a state of self-organised criticality can be 
identified if they show waves of changes and upheaval on all scales (Waldrop, 
1992:308).
The idea of a state of self-organised criticality in science functions at the level of 
comprehensive theories. Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) concept of scientific revolutions 
illustrates self-organised criticality at work in major theoretical changes that 
occur in some sciences. Normal science -  in Kuhnian terms -  and anomalies 
prepare the ground for a state of criticality. The research agenda for normal 
science are defined by comprehensive theoretical frameworks called paradigms. 
Normal science consists of “puzzle solving,” as intricate instrumental, 
conceptual, mathematical, and empirical problems left unresolved by a new 
paradigm must be solved. The challenge of fitting all the right pieces of the 
puzzle functions as an important driving force in scientific research.
Growing specialisation through normal science makes a paradigm more precise, 
accurate, and complicated. Besides strengthening the existing paradigm, growth 
through normal science also leads to the gradual disintegration of a paradigm. 
According to Kuhn, “the more precise and far-reaching that paradigm is, the 
more sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and hence of an occasion for 
paradigm change” (Kuhn, 1970:65).
Anomalies disturb normal science and threaten paradigms. Anomalies are new, 
unknown phenomena that defy easy explanation in terms of the existing 
paradigm. Normal scientists first try to explain anomalies. If explanations fail, 
scientists modify the existing paradigm. They try to resist anomalies that can 
overturn the existing paradigm as far as possible. A paradigm whose explanatory 
power has diminished as a result of accumulating anomalies leads a scientific 
discipline into a state of self-organised criticality.
A scientific revolution occurs when a new paradigm replaces the existing one. 
This revolution happens when the new paradigm explains both known facts and 
anomalies. To reject the existing paradigm is simultaneously a decision to accept 
the new. The old and the new paradigms cannot coexist, the older one must 
make way for the new. Paradigms specify the standards for normal science; 
therefore a scientific revolution changes the way science is practised. Scientific 
revolutions destroy the weak parts of existing paradigms and incorporate their 
explanatory successes.
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The relatively minor event o f the acceptance of a new comprehensive theory or 
paradigm starts a chain reaction that affects large numbers of scientists, often in 
more than one discipline. Breakdowns of all sizes can rip through scientific 
disciplines and subdisciplines and rearrange priorities among accepted results, 
dominant theories, and trusted methods or techniques. Kuhn is clear that 
revolutions of different sizes could occur and that the effects of some 
revolutions vary on members of different disciplines as a result of the 
phenomenon that a paradigm can be important for many scientific disciplines, 
though “it is not the same paradigm for all” (Kuhn, 1970:50).
The influence of an important scientific result can work its way across the 
conventional boundaries of various disciplines and fields like an epidemic, 
where “new foci of infection appear unexpectedly at points that are far away 
from previously affected regions” (Ziman, 1995:94). Galison lists some of the 
metaphors that have recently been employed for depicting these modifications of 
current scientific practice. Instead of gradual accumulation, philosophers of 
science are now referring to epistemic ruptures or fissures, Gestalt shifts, 
sociological disruptions between generations, or ontological rifts tearing like 
geological faults between theories (Galison, 1988:204).
3. Conclusion
In this article I have presented a view of science based on an appropriation of the 
theoretical framework of the sciences of complexity. I argued for three 
conceptions of science, i.e., a minimal conception of science shared by all 
sciences, an intermediate conception of science where sciences cluster together 
on the basis o f their shared interests and similarities, and a maximalist 
conception of science determined for each individual science by the community 
of scientists in that specific discipline.
This project rests on an attempt to describe and interpret the workings of science 
as a complex system. This approach to philosophy of science fits in with several 
other contemporary projects that focus on the processes through which scientists 
themselves determine their scientific disciplines. The project is not an attempt to 
reconstruct the nature of the products that science delivers and to present 
prescriptions about how science ought to function.
The project is part o f a style o f philosophising about science that focuses on 
processes that philosophers detect as common to certain classes of human 
practices and therefore propose that these processes are common to science as 
well. Such proposals need feedback and dialogue from practising scientists to 
determine whether they indeed fit scientific activity. Interdisciplinary dialogue 
between scientists and philosophers can create shared meaning about the nature, 
working, and progress of science.
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Three examples of similar projects will suffice. Joseph Rouse (1990) uses the 
idea of the scripting of the unfolding of a plot in a narrative as metaphor for the 
struggle among scientists to get priority for their work. Peter Kosso (1992 & 
1996) takes the idea of the hermeneutic circle drawn from the translation of 
foreign languages and suggests that a similar hermeneutic circle is applicable to 
all sciences through the reciprocal interaction between theory and evidence. 
Robert Dunbar (1995) depicts science as specialised, refined methods of 
problem-solving that build on universally human (and animal) abilities of 
problem-solving through trial and error.
If this style of philosophising about science finds acceptance, philosophers of 
science will not be able to legislate about science anymore, but will retain a 
modest role as interpreters of science. This role can only be fulfilled through 
interdisciplinary dialogue with practising scientists who have the tacit know­
ledge and relevant examples of what good science consists of. If practising 
scientists do not recognise their disciplinary activities in proposed philosophies 
of science, something has gone awry in philosophy of science (Kline, 1995:253). 
To avoid that, the philosopher of science will have to rely on studies of scientific 
literature, interviews, and dialogues with leading scientists, and new ideas from 
various sciences concerning theories and results that might be applicable to the 
practices of science. These requirements seem the minimum for dealing with the 
unique subject matter that philosophy of science itself investigates.
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